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Supply Shock versus
Demand Shock 
The Local Efects of New Housing in Low-Income Areas 
Brian J. Asquith, Evan Mast, and Davin Reed 
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n  Policymakers worry that 
new market-rate apartment 
buildings in gentrifying 
neighborhoods could raise 
nearby rents and accelerate 
gentrification.
n  New buildings could 
change nearby amenities or 
neighborhood reputation, 
increasing demand for the 
neighborhood enough to offset 
the effect of increasing supply.
n  We test this hypothesis 
and find that new market-
rate apartment buildings in 
low-income central city areas 
instead slow rent increases.
n  New market-rate 
apartment buildings also 
increase the number of people 
migrating from other low-
income neighborhoods to the 
nearby area.
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Public frustration over escalating housing 
costs has steadily risen, particularly in large 
urban centers, as rents eat up an ever-larger 
portion of take-home pay. A commonly suggested 
solution is to allow developers to build more 
market-rate housing, which should lower rents 
by increasing supply. Previous research suggests 
that this will indeed reduce housing costs on 
average, but many think that this overall beneft 
comes with a signifcant cost—new development 
could raise rents in the immediately surrounding 
neighborhood.
Tis runs counter to standard economic 
models of supply and demand, but a slightly more 
complicated story could generate this result. Te 
story is particularly plausible in low-income or 
gentrifying neighborhoods. Because new units 
are typically expensive, they are usually flled by 
high-income households. Tese households could 
attract new stores, restaurants, or other amenities, 
and they could also signal that a neighborhood is 
changing in a way that is attractive to other high-
income households. If these amenity or reputation 
changes are large, they could increase demand for 
the neighborhood by enough to completely ofset 
the increase in supply, causing rents to increase and 
accelerating gentrifcation. 
Tis story has substantial infuence in the policy 
debate, leading many policymakers and residents 
to strongly oppose new market-rate housing 
developments in low-income areas. However, there 
is currently very little evidence for or against the 
idea. Our recent working paper flls the gap in 
knowledge by testing this theory directly. 
We fnd that new market-rate apartment 
buildings in low-income areas do not accelerate 
gentrifcation. Instead, they slow rent increases 
in nearby apartments and increase the number 
of people who move into the area from other 
low-income neighborhoods. Tus, the efect of 
new supply appears to outweigh any amenity 
or reputation improvements. Te latter may be 
small because new housing, even in currently 
low-income areas, goes into areas that are already 
gentrifying. Tis implies that new developments 
serve mainly to absorb existing demand for an area 
We fnd that new apartment
buildings in low-income areas
do not accelerate gentrifcation.
Instead, they slow rent increases in
nearby apartments and increase
migration from other low-income
neighborhoods.
rather than to generate new demand. In turn, this 
reduces pressures on nearby rents because many 
high-income households move to the new building 
rather than outbidding lower-income households 
for nearby apartments. 
Where Are New Apartment 
Buildings Constructed? 
We start with the most basic question: Where 
do developers build new market-rate apartments? 
We focus on a setting where the afordability crisis 
is worst, the housing debate is most contentious, 
and the amenities story is most plausible: large 
(50+) unit apartment buildings constructed in 
low-income, central city neighborhoods of major 
market cities between 2010 and 2019. Tese cities 
are Atlanta, Austin, Boston, Brooklyn, Chicago, 
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Table 1  Building Neighborhood Characteristics 
No building Some building 
Household income 
2000 ($) 47,190 44,998 
2010 ($) 45,097 48,181 
2017 ($) 47,129 63,771 
2000–2010 (%) −4.4 7.1 
2010–2017 (%) 4.5 32.4 
College degree (%) 
2000 18 33 
2010 23 44 
2017 27 55 
Number of tracts 2,459 1,094 
NOTE: Means of the characteristics of the neighborhoods (census tracts) which received new buildings or not. 
“Some building” column means are weighted by the number of buildings in each neighborhood. Samples 
of buildings and neighborhoods are described in detail in the working paper: https://research.upjohn.org/ 
up_workingpapers/316/. 
SOURCE: Real Capital Analytics, Census 2000 Long Form (“2000”), American Community Survey 2006–2010 5-Year 
Estimates (“2010”), and American Community Survey 2013–2017 5-Year Estimates (“2017”). 
Denver, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, 
Portland, San Francisco, and 
Washington, D.C. 
Table 1 compares low-income 
neighborhoods (defned as a census 
tract with median household income 
below the metropolitan area median) 
that received a new building to those 
that did not.1 Two striking patterns 
emerge. First, while 2010 household 
income is similar across the two 
groups, the areas that received a new 
building saw much larger increases in 
income during both the 2000–2010 
and 2010–2017 time period. Second, 
areas receiving construction had 
substantially higher levels of college 
education, which is ofen considered 
a leading indicator of gentrifcation. 
Tese patterns suggest that developers 
tend to target areas that are already 
changing, rather than attempting to 
kickstart gentrifcation in previously 
stable neighborhoods. 
In short, new developments are 
correlated with gentrifcation, but they 
follow it rather than precede it. Tis is 
likely because relatively high rents are 
necessary to make new construction 
feasible, so developers do not build in 
areas where they cannot charge those 
rents. Note that these patterns are 
specifc to large apartment buildings 
but may be diferent for other types of 
construction. 
How Do New Buildings Afect 
Nearby Rents? 
We then use data on individual rent 
listings provided by Zillow to assess the 
central question in the policy debate: 
Do new buildings in low-income areas 
increase rents? We focus on buildings 
built between 2015 and 2016 in order 
to be able to observe at least three years 
of data before and afer construction. 
Te major challenge to estimating 
causal efects is that new buildings 
are not randomly placed. Developers 
target areas where rent is rising fast 
and is expected to continue to rise in 
the future. Because of this, a simple 
comparison of rents in areas that did 
and did not get new construction 
(similar to our income comparison 
in Table 1) would likely show that 
rents increased by more near new 
buildings. However, this diference 
would not necessarily be caused by 
the new building. We use two quasi-
experiments to overcome this problem. 
First, we compare a treatment 
group very close to the new building 
(within 250 meters) to a control 
group slightly further away (between 
250 and 600 meters). Te idea is that 
while developers might well target a 
specifc neighborhood, they cannot 
choose exactly when and where to 
build because not every parcel is for 
sale or able to be developed. Tis 
means that within a small area, the 
exact placement of a new building 
is relatively random, making our 
treatment and control group close to 
identical except that the treatment 
group is closer to the new building. 
Tis strategy is good for picking up 
very local efects of new buildings, 
like new retail options or the aesthetic 
improvement of replacing a vacant lot. 
However, new buildings might have 
broader amenity or reputation efects 
that extend beyond that geographically 
small treatment and control group. 
To account for these, we construct a 
second “experiment.” We compare rents 
near sites developed in 2015–2016 
(our treatment group) to those near 
sites that were developed in 2019 (our 
control group). Te idea is that these 
two groups of sites are both appealing 
to developers but were not developed 
at the same time due to random delays 
in the land acquisition, fnancing, city 
approval, or construction processes. 
Because our treatment buildings are 
no longer in the same neighborhood 
as control buildings, we can detect 
changes in rents that are caused by 
efects that span a larger geography. 
Both approaches suggest that new 
buildings decrease rents by 5 to 7 
percent relative to what they otherwise 
would be. In both cases, we fnd that 
rents were following similar trends 
in the treatment and control groups 
before the buildings were completed, 
but rent increases slow sharply in 
the treatment areas immediately 
afer the buildings’ completion. Tis 
efect remains constant for the three 
postconstruction years that we can 
observe before our sample ends, and, 
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in a separate estimation, we fnd no 
evidence that efects change when we 
focus on earlier buildings and observe 
fve years afer completion. 
We note that this efect is relative to 
what rents would be had the building 
not been constructed—our fnding 
does not mean that rents decreased in 
absolute terms. Because our treatment 
areas are the places most likely to 
experience the positive amenity and 
reputation efects that could cause 
rents to increase, we take this as strong 
evidence that new buildings in low-
income areas decrease rather than 
increase rents. 
Do New Buildings Afect Who Moves 
into the Surrounding Neighborhood? 
Last, we study how a new 
development changes in-migration 
to the surrounding neighborhood 
(excluding the new building itself). We 
do so using address history data from 
Infutor Data Solutions, a marketing 
intelligence company. Te data do not 
include information on individuals’ 
incomes, so we instead construct 
outcomes using the average income in 
migrants’ origin neighborhoods. 
Figure 1 shows trends in the 
number of high-income arrivals within 
250 meters of buildings completed 
in 2014 or 2015 in a low-income 
neighborhood.2 We defne high-income 
movers as those who moved from a 
we repeat the quasi-experiments that 
we used to study rent but instead use 
the origin neighborhood income of 
in-migrants as the outcome. We fnd 
that new buildings increase the number 
of arrivals from neighborhoods with 
average income below two-thirds 
of the metropolitan area median by 
three percentage points and reduce 
average origin income by a similar 
amount. Te increase in low-income 
arrivals implies that new buildings 
also decrease rents for relatively cheap 
units, not just the expensive units that 
are their most direct competitors. More 
directly, the new buildings appear to 
allow more low-income households to 
move to these frequently gentrifying 
neighborhoods. 
Policy Implications 
Te housing approval process in 
low-income and gentrifying areas is 
contentious, ofen because of concerns 
that new buildings will accelerate rent 
increases and neighborhood change. 
Our evidence suggests that this is 
typically not the case. Instead, new 
buildings slow nearby rent increases 
and increase the ability of individuals 
from low-income neighborhoods 
to move to the nearby area. While 
the neighborhoods containing new 
buildings do gain richer residents, 
the gain is concentrated in the new 
building. Tis efectively diverts high-
income individuals from outbidding 
low-income individuals for units in the 
nearby preexisting buildings. Te new 
housing thus helps absorb the pressure 
from the increasing number of high-
income individuals that want to live in 
central city neighborhoods. Moreover, 
by allowing more low-income 
households to move to an area, new 
housing helps these rapidly changing 
neighborhoods remain economically 
integrated, which research suggests 
promotes economic mobility for low-
income residents. 
Figure 1  In-Migration to Areas around New Buildings 
60 
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Total within 250m 
Nonbuilding within 250m 
Building migrants 
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neighborhood with income above 
the metropolitan median. As shown 
in the black line, the total number of 
high-income arrivals does increase by 
about 20 percent following a building’s 
completion. However, this increase 
is entirely driven by arrivals to the 
Ar
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new building itself (the red line). Te 
blue line, which shows the number of 
arrivals to the area within 250 meters 0 
excluding the new building, remains fat 
or declines slightly afer construction. 
While this suggests that a new 
building does not drastically change NOTE: This fgure shows trends in the number of in-migrants from tracts with income above the MSA-median to 
the area within 250 meters of new buildings. Nonbuilding migrants are those arriving to the area within 250 in-migration to a neighborhood, it does 
meters but not the new building, building migrants are arrivals to the new building itself, and total migrants is not provide causal evidence on the the sum. The sample includes 2011–2017 moves within 250 meters of new buildings completed in 2014–2015. 
building’s efect. In our fnal exercise, SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from Infutor Data Solutions and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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On the whole, new market-rate 
housing appears to beneft not just the 
region but also the local neighborhood. 
Tis suggests that market-rate housing 
should be an important part of any 
solution to the housing afordability 
crisis. Fears of increased rents near 
new buildings should not prevent 
governments from implementing 
desired reforms to regional housing 
supply.
We note two important caveats 
to our fndings. First, we estimate 
an average efect that may disguise 
variation across diferent types 
of buildings and neighborhoods. 
Amenity and reputation efects are 
highly subjective and may vary widely 
depending on the local context. 
Second, the buildings in our sample are 
in the types of places that developers 
historically have wanted to build. 
While these areas are central to the 
debate, the efects may be diferent 
in other types of neighborhoods. 
For example, developers rarely build 
market-rate units in very low-income 
areas with high vacancy rates, so our 
results do not speak to what would 
happen if they did. 
Notes 
1. A census tract is an area with about 
4,000 people. 
2. Our migration data contain one less 
year than our rent data, so we shif the 
buildings we study back by one year. 
This article draws on research form an Upjohn Institute
working paper, which can be found at https://research
.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/316/. 
Brian J. Asquith and Evan Mast are economists at
the Upjohn Institute. David Reed  is a community
development economic advisor at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
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Efects of
Unemployment Insurance
Reforms in Brazil 
Christopher J. O’Leary, Túlio Cravo, Ana Cristina Sierra, and Leandro Justino Veloso 
Te Brazilian unemployment 
insurance (UI) program was 
established in response to a severe 
economic recession in the 1980s. It 
is now the largest UI program in the 
Latin America and Caribbean region, 
with more than 40 million benefciaries 
between 2012 and 2016. Despite its 
size, the program operates in a labor 
market where more than one-third of 
all employees work in informal jobs 
not covered by UI. Because these latter 
workers receive no benefts when they 
are separated from their jobs, formal 
sector employment is desirable, and 
previous research has found signifcant 
fows of workers between the formal 
and informal sectors and back again, 
which UI receipt may facilitate. In 
particular, some employers may use UI 
to subsidize wages of workers they lay 
of and then recall afer UI benefts end. 
Some laid-of employees even continue 
to work informally in their prior 
jobs while receiving UI benefts (Van 
Doornik, Schoenherr, and Skrastins 
2017). Moreover, the UI program has 
historically been generous in terms 
of minimal eligibility requirements 
within the formal sector, which could 
further incentivize such back-and-
forth fows. 
Tese features have made Brazil’s UI 
program relatively expensive, and when 
a recession in 2014 further increased 
costs, the Brazilian government 
instituted reforms in the eligibility rules 
to contain future costs. We investigate 
the efects of two such changes in UI 
eligibility rules in 2015 that increased 
the work experience requirements for 
frst- and second-time UI applicants. 
While previous research estimated that 
these reforms signifcantly reduced 
layofs (Carvalho, Corbi, and Narita 
2018), our analysis, which relies on 
more complete administrative records, 
fnds smaller overall reductions in 
layofs, with somewhat larger decreases 
for workers with a single prior UI 
beneft spell. 
A Natural Experiment 
Te recession that began in early 
2014, coupled with the institutional 
features of Brazil’s UI program 
described above, led to calls for 
reforming the system. Facing general 
budget difculties and anticipating 
a signifcant rise in unemployment, 
Brazilian President Dilma Roussef 
issued Provisional Measure 665 in late 
December of 2014, raising UI eligibility 
requirements for frst and second 
time UI claimants, efective March 1, 
2015. Soon thereafer, the legislature 
passed a new law codifying eligibility 
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n The Brazilian unemployment insurance (UI) program, established in 1990, is now 
the largest in Latin America.
n UI reforms in 2015 increased work experience eligibility requirements for first- and 
second-time UI applicants.
n We find reductions in layoffs are greater for workers with one prior UI spell than 
for first-time claimants.
